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Abstract: One of the most studied issues regarding the role of natural resources in 
development is the so-called “resource curse,” the paradoxical (and contested) 
situation in which a state with abundant resources has low rates of economic growth 
per capita, high levels of income inequality, low levels of democracy, high gender 
inequality, and high levels of domestic and international conflicts that surround 
resources. Although the term implies all resources, most research by political 
scientists as well as economists and other social scientists examines the role of oil and 
hard minerals, leaving out many resources, including renewable energy resources. We 
argue that many of the causal mechanisms behind the curse, when it does manifest, 
hold for water-abundant states who have sufficient resources to create large 
hydroelectric projects. Drawing on illustrative examples of hydroelectric projects 
around the world, we demonstrate sufficient, albeit preliminary, evidence that most 
aspects of the resource curse literature apply to hydroelectric projects, at least in some 
states, and thus suggest the curse literature should be expanded to include water-
abundance. In addition, we add a new factor, variable fuel supply, which could be an 
important factor for other resources as well. We conclude with suggestions for 
developing a research agenda and note a number of policy implications.  
 







We argue that a state’s abundance of fast-flowing rivers harnessed to generate 
electricity could turn out to be as much a curse as a blessing. Over the last few 
decades, scholars have developed a significant and sophisticated literature around the 
so-called resource curse, the paradoxical (and contested) situation in which a state 
with abundant natural resources fares poorly in terms of economic growth, income 
equality, political governance, and gender equality. Despite the term, most research 
examines the role of only petroleum (by definition, crude oil and natural gas) rather 
than the larger group of natural resources. Of those focused on energy resources, few 
investigate coal and uranium, or the variety of renewable resources such as sun, wind, 
biomass, and water. Studies that do look at these other resources tend to reach 
indefinite conclusions. In one of the few assessments of renewable energy resources, 
Eisgrubler analyzes the extent to which hydropower in Laos, wind energy in 
Mongolia, and solar energy in the Middle East and North Africa could contribute to 
the resource curse (Eisgruber 2013). He finds that exports of electricity from these 
renewable sources escaped some aspects of the curse, such as economic shocks after 
resource depletion and competition over fixed amounts of resources, but exhibited 
other aspects of the curse such as a crowding out of exports, higher corruption, and 
lower government accountability. Månsson examines the link between renewable 
energy systems and social conflict but does not disaggregate his analysis to focus on 
particular technologies such as wind energy or hydroelectricity (Månsson 2015).  
 
Focusing on one renewable resource, we offer a qualitative, exploratory study that 
illustrates the ways that water used for hydroelectricity might create a type of resource 
curse or blessing. To make this case, we first provide background on the global 
hydroelectricity sector. Hydroelectric power is the biggest renewable electricity 
source used worldwide, yet has received little attention from political scientists. We 
then investigate the logic of the resource curse as developed in the extant literature, 
breaking down the various components (economic, political, social, and security) and 
types of resources, and then applying this logic to states with poorly developed 
political institutions and powerful rivers that can be dammed to generate electricity. 
We note that political leaders in developing states can gain significant rents from 
hydroelectric projects used by wealthy states and multinational corporations for 
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mining and other industries with relatively low employment needs, leading to host 
state citizens receiving little if any gains in terms of higher living standards (improved 
health and education and greater access to electricity, for example). Hydroelectric 
power can also lead to higher environmental and social costs (e.g., from disease-
ridden standing water, warmer water that harms fish populations, and citizen 
relocation), worsened or unimproved indicators of democracy (freedom of speech, 
free and fair elections, etc.) and less security due to resource-related conflicts. Using 
previous research on a variety of hydroelectric projects, we offer supporting evidence 
for each of these claims.  We then conclude with recommendations on how scholars 
can fruitfully use the resource curse literature to assess the value of hydroelectric 
dams, and how dams suggest other avenues of research for scholars who engage the 
resource curse literature.  
The Hydroelectricity Industry 
The hydroelectricity industry plays a key role in current and future electricity 
production in both the developing and developed worlds. A large-scale hydroelectric 
dam includes the actual dam to create a reservoir of water, a water intake area, a 
turbine (which turns with the force of water) and a canal called a penstock that directs 
the water to the turbine. The turbine turns a generator, creating electricity. Large dams 
have multiple turbine-generator units: for example, the Hoover Dam in the United 
States has 17 units and China’s Three Gorges has 26 units (China Three Gorges 
Corporation 2010, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 2016). The electricity flows to a 
powerhouse and is then transmitted through power lines and into industrial sites, 
businesses, and homes. Withdrawn water is carried through pipes called tailraces and 
then re-enters the river downstream. Alternatively, water can be collected in a lower 
reservoir and pumped upstream, using a reverse turbine, to the upper reservoir and 
used again. When the water is behind the gates, it is stored energy; it becomes kinetic 
energy when the gates open and the water moves through the penstock. The amount 
of electricity generated varies depending on the water flow, the hydraulic head, and 
the distance between the water surface and the turbines, among other factors.  
 
Using proven designs with centuries of experience, hydroelectric dams account for 
72.8% of global electricity production from renewable resources; the next most 
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significant renewable resource is wind energy at a distant 13.6%. Overall, 
hydropower accounts for more electricity generation (16.6%) than nuclear power 
plants (10.6%) (REN21 2015, fn 10; fn 37). More than 150 countries generate some 
grid-connected hydroelectricity. Hydroelectric dams supply at least 50% of electricity 
in more than 60 countries and greater than 90% in about 20 countries. In states as 
diverse as Bhutan, Norway, Paraguay, and several African countries, essentially all 
commercial electricity comes from hydroelectricity. As of 2016, there are 9,595 
hydropower dams, of which 5,727 are exclusively for electricity production; the rest 
have multiple uses such as irrigation and flood control (International Commission on 
Large Dams 2016). Despite the wide use of hydroelectricity, there remains significant 
untapped energy: using conservative estimates, the World Energy Council states that 
only about one-third of the world hydropower capacity has been developed (World 
Energy Council 2016). Tables 1 and 2 provide a global perspective of hydroelectric 
dams. 
 
Table 1: Largest Hydroelectric Dams and Plants in Operation 







1 Three Gorges 
(Sanxia) 
China 2010 22,500 85 
2 Itaipú Brazil/Paraguay 1991 14,000 90 
3 Guri (Simón 
Bolίvar) 
Venezuela 1986 10,200 52 
4 Tucuruί Brazil 1984 8,370 21 
5 Grand Coulee USA 1942/1980 6,809 21 
6 Sayano- 
Shushenskaya 
Russia 1985/1990 6,400 23 
7 Krasnoyarskaya Russia 1967 6,000 20 
8 Robert-Bourassa Canada 1979 5,616 37 
9 Bratsk Russia 1967 4,500 23 
 
Table 2: Hydroelectric Installed Capacity Based on National Production  
Rank Country TWh Percent of World Total 
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1 China 360 14.0 
2 Canada 356 11.3 
3 Brazil 349 11.2 
4 United States 318 10.2 
5 Russia 175 5.6 
6 Norway 120 3.8 
7 India 114 3.6 
8 Japan 96 3.1 
9 Venezuela 79 2.5 
10 Sweden 62 2.0 
 Rest of the world 1016 32.7 
 Total  3121 100.0 
Sources for Tables 1 and 2: (International Commission on Large Dams 2016, U.S. 
Department of the Interior 2016) 
Note: MW = megawatts; TWh = terawatt-hour, which equals 1 terawatt of energy for 
an hour 
 
The allure of hydropower rests on several factors. Unlike some renewable energy 
options, hydropower is a mature technology that is widely considered cost-
competitive; operating and maintenance costs are low. (International Energy Agency 
2012). It is durable, reliable, and efficient. Hydropower plants can “store” large 
amounts of energy in reservoirs. Hydropower has considerable potential in parts of 
the world where demand for energy is expected to grow most significantly: the 
developing parts of Africa, Asia, and South America. Dams provide other benefits, 
such as regulating water flows, mitigating floods, and irrigating crops.  
 
Hydropower is seen as playing an especially important role in lower income countries. 
The International Energy Agency estimates that emerging economies could foster 
social and economic development by doubling hydroelectric production by 2050. 
Compared to fossil fuels, increasing energy through hydropower would prevent up to 
3 billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually (International Energy Agency 
2016). Similarly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change praised hydropower 
as a catalyst for development, and World Bank reports indicate that large hydropower 
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projects can bring salient multiplier effects of $0.40 to $1 for every $1 invested 
beyond the cost of the dam (Kumar et al. 2011).  
 
Given hydropower’s current and future major role in electricity production and 
renewed support from development banks and some environmentalists and climate 
scientists, we explore how water might be prone to its own type of resource curse. To 
make this case, we connect hydroelectricity with the complex literature on the 
resource curse, noting the literature’s diverse findings in terms of resources being a 
blessing or a curse. To begin, we provide an overview of the resource curse literature 
including those aspects that are contested.  
Conceptualizing and Contesting the Resource Curse 
Starting with Auty, who first named the concept, economists and political scientists 
have published extensively on the resource curse (Auty 1993). Observations of the 
alleged curse go back to the 17th century. At this time, the Netherlands was wealthier 
than Spain, despite gold and silver flowing into Spain, and Switzerland and Japan 
rushed ahead of mineral rich Russia (Sachs and Warner 1995); these comparisons 
suggested there was something about resources that paradoxically undermined 
economic growth. These arguments were given modern force by Argentine economist  
Prebisch who observed economies of commodity-exporting states in Latin America 
devastated by collapsing world prices during the late 1920s and the 1930s. (Davis 
1995, Hunt 1989). Since these original economic studies that focused on economic 
growth, scholars have identified a wide variety of ills associated with resource 
abundance: high income inequality, uneven regional economic development, 
authoritarian governments, gender inequality, and domestic and international violence.  
 
Despite this evidence, some doubt there is such a curse (Gochberg and Menaldo 2016; 
Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis 2015), or have found that not all aspects of the multi-
dimensional curse hold up when more cases are analyzed or other variables held 
constant (Ross 2012). Despite its massive diamond wealth, Botswana is often touted 
as an example of a resource-rich developing state that dodged (some of) the curse: it 
has been a peaceful state, with relatively high gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita (Dunning 2005). Others find that resources can help states consolidate their 
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democracies (Gurses 2011, Liou and Musgrave 2013). In addition, as Tompson 
argues about Russia, some resource-rich states have many of the problems associated 
with the curse, but these are not caused by the resources (Tompson 2006).  
 
Overall, there is a growing consensus that resources are not destiny: certain state 
policies and historical paths can result in wealth, equality, democracy, and peace. 
Government institutions, including types of contracts, are key factors in whether 
resource-rich states are cursed or blessed. When political institutions are more 
“grabber friendly,” having more natural resources depresses aggregate income, 
whereas “producer friendly” institutions increase income (Mehlum, Moene, and 
Torvik 2006). Using the former Soviet states as their cases, Jones Luong and 
Weinthal argue that the structure of the natural resource ownership and management 
(whether state-owned, privately-owned or a mixture) determines whether or not a 
country suffers from the resource curse (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010). Others find 
that states without effective government institutions and increasing dependence on 
resources tend to deteriorate further over time whereas those with strong democratic 
institutions in place before their major mineral discoveries, avoid the curse; notable 
examples of the latter include Australia, Canada, and the Scandinavian countries (De 
Rosa and Iootty 2012, Alexeev and Conrad 2009). 
 
One of the challenges in assessing the literature is that scholars have not reached a 
consensus on what defines resource-rich. Auty defines mineral economies as 
developing states with at least 8% of their GDP and 40% of export earnings from 
minerals (Auty 1993, 3). Colgan, who focuses on security issues, puts the minimum at 
10% of GDP and includes states with modest exports or even net imports, thus 
increasing the number of states considered resource-rich (Colgan 2014). Haglund sets 
the bar at 25% or more for the value of exports (Haglund 2011), while Le Billon 
differentiates between dependence, abundance, and mode of exploitation (Le Billon 
2008). In addition, some scholars look at natural resource wealth per capita. Using 
this measurement, studies have found positive relationships between resource wealth 
and growth (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009) and oil wealth and democracy (Gurses 
2011). We do not take a position on the right measurement, but instead point out that 
how one measures resource-rich affects the findings, including what aspect of the 
curse might or might not apply. For example, if we lower the threshold for exports, as 
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Colgan does, the argument about foreign currencies swamping the local currency do 
not apply, whereas other aspects of the resource curse might still hold. We take this 
into account in our arguments about hydropower.  
 
A final issue in the literature, and the one we address most directly, is the type of 
resource that has been at the center of debates. The bulk of the literature, particularly 
by political scientists, is about oil. Some scholars use the term petroleum, which 
technically includes natural gas and oil, even when their research is only on oil. This 
might seem a minor distinction, one that can be glossed over, but the difference is 
significant and can affect the extent to which the resource curse arguments apply. For 
example, states that rely on oil exports are more exposed to price fluctuations due to 
the relatively global market, compared to natural gas exporters and their regional 
markets.1 Much of the earlier work and many of the large-n studies by economists 
look at hard minerals as well as oil and gas (Auty 1993). Some studies include the 
type of natural resources Adam Smith had in mind, such as crop land and timber. A 
few consider whether coal-rich regions within a state, such as in low-income 
Appalachia in the United States, are part of the resource curse (Partridge, Betz, and 
Lobao 2012; Collins, Hansen, and Hendryx 2012). Some studies isolate diamonds, 
using Sierra Leone as an example of a cursed country or Botswana and Namibia as 
states that have escaped the curse (Le Billon 2008, Khoury 1990). Additionally, a few  
scholars have considered whether renewable energy sources create conditions for a 
curse. Eisgruber shows the export of electricity derived from renewable resources is 
susceptible to a number of symptoms of the resource curse, including economic issues 
like crowding out the manufacturing sector and institutional issues like corruption and 
declining governmental accountability (Eisgruber 2013).  
 
Different resources may trigger different aspects of the curse. For example, coal is 
most often consumed domestically rather than being a major export and therefore may 
not create the same kinds of rents as oil or gas. Coal also has fewer price swings than 
petroleum products (World Coal Association 2017), removing that causal mechanism 
from the curse argument. Renewable energy sources may not create the same gender 
inequalities within the sector that we see in the extractive industries (Pearl-Martinez 
                                                 
1 The distinction between oil as a global market and natural gas as regional is diminishing somewhat as 
liquefied natural gas is creating a more globalized market.  
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and Stephens 2016).  These are empirical questions; we raise them here to emphasize 
the importance of analyzing individual aspects of the curse for each type of resource, 
rather than collapsing all resources, and all causal mechanisms, into a single argument.  
 
In the next section, we dive into the primary focus of the paper: how water via 
hydroelectric dams can create some of the same problems associate with oil, gas, and 
hard minerals. We consider the different forms of the potential curse–economic, 
social, political, and security–and their underlying causal mechanisms.  
The Case for a Contingent Water Resource Curse 
Much of the logic of the resource curse applies to an abundance of water that can be 
used for hydroelectric power when it comprises a substantial part of the state’s (or 
provinces’) economy and some export earnings. Like petroleum and hard minerals, 
states are unevenly endowed with water. Furthermore, states choose whether or not to 
extract or dam these resources for domestic commercial development, local 
community development, and/or export. As with fossil fuels, low income states often 
must rely on external actors to fund the projects. These actors usually include 
multinational corporations based in wealthy states, and sometimes development 
agencies, including the World Bank and regional development banks. In short, water 
has much in common with the resources commonly associated with the resource curse.    
 
Below, we discuss myriad causal mechanisms as they might apply to the 
hydroelectricity industry. We reference specific cases of hydroelectric projects to 
illustrate how these mechanisms have played out around the world. We refer to a 
contingent curse, as our conclusions are consistent with the larger literature in finding 
that water is not destiny: it can create positive or negative outcomes contingent on 
how political leaders handle the resource.  
Economic Growth 
The literature identifies four ways that resources can paradoxically undermine the 
state’s economic growth that also apply to hydroelectric power: price fluctuations, 
Dutch disease, enclave economies, and rent-seeking. In addition, we suggest another 
causal mechanism that has not previously been included in the curse literature: 
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variable fuel supply.  
 
Compared to manufactured goods, many commodities are characterized by massive 
price fluctuations in a short period of time due to external factors, leaving the state 
more vulnerable. For example, financial speculation in commodity derivatives 
products, known as the financialization of commodities markets, is believed to cause 
price increases in food commodities (Clapp 2012, Clapp and Helleiner 2012a, Clapp 
and Helleiner 2012b). This volatility leads to unstable and unpredictable income for 
the state, which may lead to overspending, followed by severe economic hardship or 
even debt default.  
 
Electricity profits share this volatility problem if there is an electricity grid cutting 
across state borders, making the state vulnerable to other states’ actions, such as 
building new power plants that increase domestic supply and decrease cross-border 
demand, or foreign policy crises such as a terrorist attack on a power plant that results 
in sudden increases in demand, or even economic shocks like trade disputes or 
embargoes. Thus, it is possible for significant price fluctuations, and thus export 
earnings, to occur with an abundance of hydroelectric power. Whether states have 
experienced enough of a fluctuation to damage long-term economic growth is a 
matter for empirical investigation, which we do not pursue here but argue should be 
part of a research agenda.  
 
Another major factor thought to account for lower growth rate is the Dutch disease, a 
malady dubbed by The Economist in 1977, referring to the appreciation of the Dutch 
exchange rate following the Netherlands’ major natural gas find in the 1960s. Dutch 
disease results when there is a booming tradable sector following a major discovery of 
a natural resource. The boom results in the local currency gaining strength, which in 
turn undermines lagging sectors by raising the costs of their exports, leading to a 
downturn in trade. The lagging sector is usually manufactured goods and/or 
agriculture. Furthermore, the higher value of the currency leads consumers to choose 
to import goods rather than purchasing domestically-manufactured and locally grown   
agricultural goods, which are comparatively more expensive. The increasing 
employment demand in the booming sector results in an influx of labor from the 
lagging and any non-tradable (service) sectors, further undermining the non-boom 
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sectors (Corden 1984). Eventually, the state’s economy becomes highly reliant on the 
boom sector, further exposing it to the fluctuating prices and external shocks. The 
sudden influx of American gold into the Spanish markets in the 16th century and the 
negative impact this had on Spanish industries has been interpreted as a pre-petroleum 
example of Dutch disease (Forsyth and Nicholas 1983). While the Dutch disease can 
be caused by any booming sector, natural resources are considered likely causes 
because of their high-export value and discoveries that can lead to a sudden boom.  
 
Although hydroelectricity does not appear to have caused Dutch disease in most 
hydroelectric states, primarily because most states do not export high enough amounts 
to create the reaction described above, this has been the case in Laos. A 
predominately hydropower state, Laos has electricity grid connections to China’s 
Yunnan Province, Thailand, and Vietnam. Most exports go to Thailand and, to a 
lesser extent, Vietnam. With 20 hydropower projects now completed with a total 
capacity of 3,000 MW and an expected 40-50 more projects by 2025, the Lao 
government envisions its state as the “power battery” of the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (International Finance Corporation 2017a). In 2008, electricity exports 
equaled $98 million, accounting for 30% of total export revenue. By 2010, export 
earnings from electricity had jumped to $370 million, following three hydropower 
plants coming on-line: Nam Theun 2, Nam Ngum 2 and Nam Lik 1/2. More export-
oriented hydropower projects are being developed with the help of the Asian 
Development Bank and numerous foreign companies (Asian Development Bank 2010, 
5, 7). The Dutch disease spending effect has led to inflation and real exchange rate 
appreciation resulting in loss of competitiveness, slowdown in industrialization, and 
even a shrinking of manufacturing and other tradable sectors (Jusi 2011, 261). 
Whether this effect has a long-term negative outcome remains to be seen. At this 
point, some might argue that this very poor, landlocked country has at least found a 
valuable resource it can export for money it would not otherwise earn.  
 
Enclave economies are also said to account for lower economic growth than expected 
for a resource-rich state. We find this casual mechanism holds for water as well. 
Enclaves have few local linkages to the domestic economy, such as factories to 
supply inputs or process outputs, or a direct connection to agriculture and tourism, 
which are often key economic sectors in lower income states. The resource sectors 
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tend to have high investment to labor ratios, requiring expensive investments but 
requiring minimal local employment. As a result, the political leadership lacks 
incentives to develop the domestic population’s education, health, and other aspects 
of social welfare. This leaves the population ill-equipped for any sudden decreases in 
economic growth, whether from domestic or global forces. Without skills and with 
poor health and education, the domestic population cannot move into, or help build, 
other sectors when the booming sector suffers declining prices.  
 
McCully (2001) suggests that the hydropower alliances formed by corporate, financial, 
and development partners amount to an “iron triangle” that continually transfers 
revenues from developing states to developed ones. While possible, we would not 
expect these kinds of enclaves in part because foreign nationals are not required to 
stay on the job for decades as has been the case with oil, notably in Nigeria and 
Angola.  
 
However, we find other manifestations of enclave economies that can lead to certain 
negative outcomes. Hydropower projects often rely on foreign-trained engineers, 
managers, and other specialists (Hilson and Laing 2016). Enclaves might be created 
around both during dam construction and after electricity is produced. One example is 
the 2,400 MW Bakun Hydroelectric Project on the island of Borneo in Malaysia, 
which started operating in 2011. Construction created boom and bust cycles and 
inflationary pressures on local commodities such as fuel, food, and clothing, driving 
up prices and leading to shortages. The project led to a crowding out of exports and 
industrial activity. Once completed, the dam’s generated electricity went primarily to 
industrial smelters rather than to the local population. The dam building and the 
completed hydropower project offered no jobs or skills training to the villagers 
displaced by the dam, and the two capital-intensive smelters expected to receive 
electricity—one a 1.5 million tons/year project being managed by the Chinese that 
would be the largest in the world—accounted for almost 70% of economic activity for 
the state. This contrasts with a local economy before the dam that was highly 
diversified across tourism, logging, natural gas liquefaction, and light manufacturing 
(Sovacool and Bulan 2011). 
 
Rent-seeking, a key aspect of the resource curse argument, leads to poor economic 
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growth and political governance; we address political governance in the next section. 
Writing about commodities–corn, flax, and fisheries–Adam Smith long ago warned 
about rents, which he defined as “the income of men who love to reap where they 
never sowed” (Smith [1776] 1937, 399). States use the rents from resource exports to 
lower taxes, increase social spending, and pay off patrons in return for political 
support. This unproductive economic activity helps keep the leaders in power, but 
does not develop the economy (Mahdavy 1970, Karl 1997, Barma et al. 2012). Given 
the high capital costs needed for large hydroelectric dams and the necessary 
partnerships between the government and firms in building the dam, plant and 
electricity grids, rent-seeking is a likely economic risks associated with the resource 
curse (Butterworth and Harpe 2009, Transparency International 2008, Haas 2008).  
 
The 2,700 MW Yacyretá Dam between Argentina and Paraguay, which generates 
about half of all the electricity consumed by both countries, demonstrates how rent-
seeking applies to hydropower. Originally expected to cost $1.5 billion, the project’s 
costs skyrocketed to $15 billion, primarily due to financial misallocation and bribery. 
Argentine President Carlos Menem later called it “a well of corruption” (Ribeiro 1994, 
49). In 1973, during the last government of Juan D. Peron, plans for Yacyretá were 
drafted with an expected completion date of 1983. A joint Argentinian-Paraguayan 
commission, the Yacyretá Binational Entity, was established to manage the project. It 
spent more than five years hosting meetings, debating plans, and spending some $1 
billion to build two towns needed to house 7,000 preliminary workers (Christian 
1990). Work did not initiate until 1984; the dam was completed in 1994, eleven years 
later than anticipated. In addition to the misappropriation of funds within the Yacyretá 
Binational Entity, the consortium that won the contract for the dam, led by French and 
Italian firms, was accused of disbursing hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes. 
Much of the $27 million intended to help compensate villagers for relocation were 
instead funneled to contractors and obscure organizations (Ribeiro 1994).  In sum, this 
project demonstrates the potential for rent-seeking which undermines the expected  
economic growth, a key feature associated with the resource curse.  
 
Finally, we identify a new economic cause behind the contingent resource curse: fuel 
supply variability. While the literature focuses on fluctuating prices, little is said 
about fluctuating fuel supply. Water levels vary not only by season but also due to 
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climate changes, most importantly drought which is increasingly common in many 
states. This type of trouble with hydropower is perhaps best illustrated with the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, where hydropower supplies more than 99% of 
national electricity. As Figure 1 indicates, hydroelectric supply has been erratic, often 
jumping by double-digit rates, which in turn affects price and electricity reliability 
(Green, Sovacool, and Hancock 2015). Another dimension of variability relates to 
water quality: waters rich in minerals or with high levels of chemicals from 
agricultural runoff can corrode hydroelectric machinery. In addition, debris from 
logging and deforestation can increase silt, causing electricity levels to fluctuate 
significantly, as has happened in Malaysia (Sovacool and Bulan 2011). 
 
Figure 1: Annual changes in hydroelectricity generation for the Democratic Republic 




Source: Green, Sovacool, and Hancock, 2015 
 
In addition, the World Commission on Dams noted the dangers of increased 
extraction of water from lakes and rivers as well as ground for industrial purposes and 
drinking water, thus reducing water available for the hydroelectric dams (World 
Commission on Dams 2000, 7-8). Drought is another concern. In 2016, the US 
Drought Information System reported that most continents are experiencing drought 
(Global Drought Information Center 2016). With changing water levels, dams cannot 
always reliably produce electricity. For example, in May 2016, under the grip of an 
extensive drought, India reported that there was insufficient water to operate the Tehri 































































































drought in 34 years, leaving the dam in Gaborone (Botswana) at 1.2% of capacity 
(Mungai 2015).  
Authoritarianism, Social Inequality, and Violence 
Since the original work by economists on economic growth rates, political scientists 
in particular but also some economists and other social scientists, observe a number of 
other disorders that they argue are associated with over-reliance on resources, 
including authoritarian governments, social inequalities, and greater domestic and 
international conflict. These newer aspects of the resource curse relate to somewhat 
different causal mechanisms.  
 
High resource levels can be associated with low levels of democracy. As noted above, 
resources are often associated with high rents. In addition to causing lower growth 
rates, some scholars find that a high dependence on external rents increases the 
likelihood or degree of authoritarianism (Crystal 1990, Karl 1997, Ross 2001, Jensen 
and Wantchekon 2004). In these so-called rentier states, the leadership relies on rents 
generated by resources rather than production, investment, and risk management 
(Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, 817). Tax collection is a key part of most of these 
political arguments. Able to rely on foreign earnings from oil exports, political leaders 
of oil-rich states do not have to tax their citizens. As a result, citizens agree to an 
unstated bargain under which they do not pay taxes in exchange for having a weak 
political voice.2 This leads to worse governance ratings, operationalized as higher 
corruption, less voice and accountability, less political stability and more violence, 
ineffective governance, poor regulatory frameworks, and lower scores on rule of law. 
This weak governance is the result of leaders not being held accountable by their 
constituents (Karl 1997, Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). 
 
In addition to the tax argument, scholars argue that political leaders who have wide 
discretion in how to distribute these resource revenues are able to pay off would-be 
opponents and to reward a small group of the selectorate who support the incumbent. 
This winning coalition has strong incentives to remain true to the incumbent, making 
it more difficult for contesting leaders to take power and thus for democracy to take 
                                                 
2 This argument is further developed by (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010) 
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hold (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). In Nigeria, for example, the state uses oil 
revenue to win the loyalty of powerful groups and individuals and to direct benefits to 
particular constituencies while enabling extraordinary illicit wealth to be accumulated 
and secured with impunity (Watts 2016). Oil revenues create a political order shaped 
through patronage rather than taxes, the same story Karl (1997) expounds about 
Venezuela nearly 20 years ago. 
 
As with oil and gas, state-owned hydroelectric power plants can result in significant 
rents being collected by government leaders who then require fewer or no taxes from 
the population. Under the economic section, we discussed the case of the Yacyretá 
dam between Argentina and Paraguay and how rents led to corruption. Our 
preliminary research does not show that the dam undermined democracy but a more 
thorough empirical investigation might show otherwise. In any case, the logic holds 
for high-cost hydropower projects that could bring in significant rents.  
 
Social inequality has also been linked to resource abundance. While hydropower 
projects can benefit the entire country through increased electricity production and 
may have a positive multiplier effect on the overall economy, as noted above, this is 
not always the case. Much of the income for building the dams goes to major 
multinational corporations based in rich countries, notably Alstom Hydro (France), 
Bechtel (United States), General Electric (Canada and United States), Hitachi (Japan), 
Mitsubishi (Japan), and Siemens (Germany) (McCully 2001). Consistent with rent-
seeking arguments, electricity sometimes goes only to the domestic elite and to big 
industries, including mining operations owned by foreign companies.  
 
In addition, as happens with extractive industries, populations near the site must 
sometimes be relocated, in this case when dams flood towns. Between 1986 and 1993, 
an estimated 4 million people were displaced annually by activities related to starting 
construction of 300 new (hydroelectric and other) dams each year (World 
Commission on Dams 2000). In some cases, scholars argue that the damage done to 
displaced populations far outweighs the economic benefits (Isaacman and Isaacman 
2013).  
 
One of the most significant displacements occurred in China. The 22,500 MW Three 
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Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River is the largest in the world. Because of its sheer 
scale, the project required the flooding of 34,000 hectares of land, about 50% of 
which were rice paddies; 22% gardens; 10% forests, and 1% fishponds. Moreover, the 
government set restrictions on the clearing of land on terraced hills to prevent 
landslides around the reservoir area. About 40% of resettled farmers lost their 
employment and their land under resettlement programs (Jackson and Sleigh 2000). 
The negative impact on food security and agricultural productivity was severe. The 
collective losses of 28,000 hectares of rice fields resulted in an annual grain shortage 
of 120,000 tons (Brown, Magee, and Xu 2008). 
 
The 1,500 MW Manwan Dam in China, which sits on the Lancang River (part of the 
Upper Mekong region), was completed in 1996, and offers another telling case of 
income inequality related to a dam. Its construction led to severe increases in poverty 
in many rural areas. The dam required the permanent flooding and abandonment of 
dozens of rice paddy fields and hundreds of fruit trees, both staples of the local 
economy. As a result, an overall decrease in rice yields occurred along with rising 
unemployment. Hundreds of forage lands were inundated, leading to a loss of cattle, 
sheep, and mules. Though the dam led to more reliable irrigation in some places, it 
led to water shortages in others, due to massive erosion and landslides rendering 
water conveyance projects untenable. In aggregate, these effects increased rural 
poverty. The Statistics Bureau of Yunnan Province reported that the per capita income 
in 1991, before the dam was built, of Manwan resettlers and those later impacted by 
the dam was 6.7% higher than the province average. After the dam was completed, 
this population’s per capita income dropped to less than half the provincial average 
(Tilt, Braun, and He 2009). 
 
In addition to displacements, riverine communities may be negatively affected by 
changed river flow, degradation of water quality, and fragmented ecosystems (Cernea 
1997, 2008, Tilt, Braun, and He 2009, Aiken and Leigh 2015). Dams can disrupt 
fisheries and drinking water supplies, threatening the livelihoods of the local 
populations. They can reinforce inequalities between government officials, the 
companies that build the dams, and the local communities (Siciliano and Urban 2017).  
 
A final social issue is gender equality. Preliminary research suggests that women may 
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be more negatively impacted by dam projects than are men. Women are generally 
more vulnerable to housing relocation, access to land, and food security (Mehta and 
Srinivasan 2000, International Finance Corporation 2017b). In evaluating renewable 
energy projects in Latin America, the Inter-American Development Bank indentified 
a number of issues that prevented women from participating and benefiting equally in 
the projects. For example, when consultations were held with the local community, 
women’s working hours often prevented them from attending (Marcos 2014). 
Although there appears to be less gender inequality in renewable resoruces than in 
fossil fuel sectors, the renewable energy sector as a whole remains overwhelmingly 
male (International Renewable Energy Agency 2017). For these reasons, hydropower 
projects may provide uneven opportunities based on gender and even worsen gender 
inequality.   
 
Overall, as in the case of the extractive industries, hydropower projects can create or 
exacerbate income, regional, and gender inequalities. The last aspect of the resource 
curse relates to security.  
 
Some scholars find that resource-abundant states have higher rates of civil and 
international conflict. Resources can be used to fund civil wars, as in the case of 
diamonds in Sierra Leone, and create a motive for states to invade, as when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in 1990 (Le Billon 2004). However, as Le Billon argues, the resource 
curse argument as it relates to violence is a specific type of argument. It is not about 
just belligerents fighting over resources. Instead, other aspects of the resource curse 
make states vulnerable to conflict. Research on civil wars finds that states with low 
per capita income, declining growth rates, and weak government capacity and 
authority–all aspects of the resource curse–are most vulnerable to domestic conflict 
(Le Billon 2008). Revolutionary states who are rich in oil are more likely to launch 
wars than similar states without oil (Colgan 2014). Soysa finds that when evaluating 
natural resources broadly, to include renewable (such as cropland and forests) and 
nonrenewable resources (mineral deposits), civil war is unrelated to natural resources 
measured per capita. However, when looking only at mineral wealth, there is a 
correlation with high rates of civil conflict (Soysa 2000).  
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Like other high value resources, hydroelectric dams can become flashpoints for 
terrorists or saboteurs or targeted during civil and interstate conflicts. Unlike many 
resources and their infrastructure, such as diamonds, oil wells, and petroleum 
refineries, hydroelectric projects cannot be easily captured and sold on the market for 
high value. As a result, they are not prone to the same types of violence often 
associate with the resource curse. Nevertheless, two types of conflict present risks: 
violence in opposition to building dams and terrorism or sabotage.  
 
There is a long history of hydroelectric projects being the subject if not always the 
cause of domestic and interstate conflict. An early and dramatic case occurred during 
World War II when Norway led an attack on the Nazi-held Norsk hydroelectric plant 
in Telemark, Norway. The Nazi regime was using the facility to collect heavy water 
for a planned atomic bomb (Mears 2003, Haukelid 1954).  
 
On another occasion, in the 1960s, the Norwegian Water Resources and Electricity 
Board initiated plans for the 150 MW Alta Hydropower Project. Although the stated 
justification of the project was to meet rapidly growing demand for electricity, the 
Sámi, an indigenous group with deep cultural roots, fought against the dam on the 
grounds that it would conflict with their fishing and farming interests. Although the 
Norwegian Parliament twice approved construction of the dam, local opposition was 
so fierce that the project was temporarily scuttled. In 1981, the government forcibly 
relocated a Sámi community from the Masi village; construction commenced. 
Hundreds of protestors took to the streets, resulting in a major confrontation that 
resulted in 600 police—10% of the national force—concentrated at the dam site. The 
police lived on a ship anchored in the Alta harbor and were transported by military 
trucks to the construction site, where they remained until construction finished. The 
Alta Hydropower Project, as one study concluded, “Created one of the most dramatic 
political conflicts in Norway since World War II” (Andersen and Midttun 1985, 317).  
 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reported 25 dam attacks between 2001 
and 2011, nearly half of which were on hydropower plants. Attackers used 
improvised explosive devises, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars, assault teams, 
and incendiary devices on dams in Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Thailand and the United States (U.S. 
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Department of Homeland Security 2012). In addition, both domestic and interstate 
conflict can break out over allocation of scarce resources, including water (Andrews-
Speed et al. 2012, Bernauer 2012, Hensel, Mitchell, and Sowers 2006, Wolf 2007, 
Wolf et al. 2005).  
 
The following examples, taken from Gleick and Heberger (2014), demonstrate the 
range of attacks on hydroelectric projects and the states in which these occur. In 1970, 
South African troops moved into Angola to occupy the Ruacana hydropower complex. 
In 1993, during the Yugoslavian civil war, army forces detonated explosives at the 
Peruća Dam, attempting to wipe out Croatian villages and a port city. Croatia 
counterattacked allowing military engineers to reach the dam and release water before 
it burst. In 2001, U.S. military forces bombed the hydroelectric facility at Kajaki Dam 
in Helmand Province, cutting off electricity to Kandahar. In 2012, Uzbekistan cut 
natural gas deliveries to Tajikistan in retaliation for a Tajik hydroelectric dam that 
may disrupt water needed for agriculture in Uzbekistan. Finally, in 2012, Syrian 
rebels fighting President Bashar al-Assad overran government forces and captured the 
Tishrin hydroelectric dam on the Euphrates River.  
 
In sum, we find that many aspects of the resource curse, when carefully unpacked, 
apply to hydroelectric projects, suggesting a fruitful research agenda that has not yet 
been explored. In the conclusion, we suggest contingencies for the hydro-curse and 
avenues for further research.  
Conclusion 
The resource curse (and blessing) literature is vast, covering a variety of resources 
and demonstrating both benefits and costs to states and citizens who have an 
abundance of resources. Since Auty’s 1993 article referencing a resource curse, a 
plethora of natural resources have been analyzed using and expanding on resource 
curse concepts and logic. Quantitative and qualitative studies have examined a variety 
of states and world regions, with most analyses focusing on oil and hard minerals. 
Despite decades of research, there has not been detailed analysis of how this literature 
might apply to states with an abundance of water, specifically enough water to 
warrant building hydroelectric plants. We make the case that many of the same causal 
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mechanisms used for fossil fuels apply equally well to hydropower, and reference a 
variety of cases to illustrate our points.  
 
Since the resource curse literature has not systematically been applied to hydroelectric 
power, we started by providing an overall introduction to the hydroelectric industry, 
noting the ways in which hydropower can be a blessing to a state, particularly in 
terms of electricity supply and the economic development that can result from greater 
access for individuals and companies. We noted that many energy and development 
experts consider large hydropower a reliable, cost-effective, and relatively clean 
energy source. We then untangled many of the often-conflated aspects of the curse, as 
Table 3 summarizes. We evaluated whether the logic could be applied to water-rich 
states with large hydropower dams. In most cases, we conclude that the logic holds. In 
addition, we identified a new causal mechanism for low economic growth: the role of 
variable resource supply, which can lead to unstable economic growth.  
 
Table 3: Proposed causal mechanisms for a hydroelectricity resource curse 
Category Negative correlations and causal mechanisms  
Economics Price fluctuations, Dutch disease, enclave economies, rent-seeking, and 
variable fuel supply 
Governance Less democracy and worse governance related to rent-seeking and the 
rentier state 
Equality Income inequality, uneven regional development, gender inequality 
Security More conflict: fighting over resources, resources as easy money for 
combatants; terrorists and saboteurs.  
 
Our analysis suggests that a water curse is more likely under the following conditions: 
when there are large dams to be constructed, as these can take a decade or more to 
build and create more opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption; when there are 
electricity grids that cross borders and sufficient electricity produced for export, 
creating the possibility of Dutch disease; when the dams are far from population 
centers, increasing the likelihood that the local population will not benefit from 
greater electricity access, that enclave economies will form, and that some regions 
will benefit more than others; and when there are existing conflicts over water and 
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territory, increasing the likelihood of hydroelectric dams being targeting for sabotage 
or capture.  In addition, we anticipate that consistent with findings on nonrenewable 
resources, water is more likely to be a blessing for the whole economy when the right 
institutions are in place.  
 
As scholars have concluded regarding other resources, there is not an inherent curse 
or blessing. Resources are what people make of them. Properly structured institutions 
can ameliorate or eliminate the potential negatives of resources. A number of states–
such as Canada, Norway, and the United States–have used hydropower to 
significantly benefit their citizens and economies. Our aim here is to highlight the 
complex, multidimensional aspects of renewable resource wealth. Just as the oil 
wealth does not have to be a curse, water resources too can be managed in such a way 
that negative consequences are avoided. Our sample of hydroelectricity cases 
supporting our arguments is illustrative. We do not test hypotheses. Rather, our goal 
is to highlight how some aspects of the resource curse arguments, now well developed 
for oil and hard minerals, can be applied to water.  
 
Given our findings, we call for a more extensive research agenda using this analytical 
lens to determine under what circumstances and in what ways the curse applies to 
water-rich states. We propose that researchers complement our suggestive qualitative 
analysis with more rigorous case studies and quantitative analysis. The International 
Commission on Large Dams, for example, is compiling a new database that covers 
most countries around the world. When complete, this database would be a useful 
resource for those wishing to run statistical tests or conduct hypothesis testing. 
Researchers could check average economic growth or democracy levels before and 
after a dam is constructed to see if any changes occur. This does not get around the 
non-random nature of where dams are constructed, but it would allow scholars to 
search for correlations that could be investigated further for possible causation. More 
aggregated, and longitudinal data, would help further support, refine, or even refute 
the arguments raised here.  
 
While numerous scholars have published on the pros and cons of dams, the resource 
curse/blessing literature has the advantage of providing a systematic and comparative 
way to assess the value of dams. In addition, many analyses of the resource curse 
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provide recommendations for how states can turn risks into rewards. Most notably, 
analysts argue that strong political institutions can lead to better outcomes and that 
sovereign wealth funds can help prevent the curse from taking hold by preserving 
funds for times when prices fall. The curse literature might also benefit from 
including findings from those who analyze dams. For example, dams are often 
delayed in their implementation due to cost-overruns and the challenges of 
coordinating megaprojects (Ansar et al. 2014, Sovacool, Gilbert, and Nugent 2014, 
Sovacool, Nugent, and Gilbert 2014). Analysis might benefit from considering cost-
overruns and what this means for a resource being a curse or a blessing. In addition, 
renewable energy programs that (primarily) wealthy states have formed and 
advocated for, such as the renewable energy and energy efficiency center in West 
Africa, incorporate gender mainstreaming–a requirement to always consider how 
energy intersects with gender issues (Hancock 2015). Other resource projects could 
incorporate similar imperatives.   
 
Other policy implications arise from the analysis as well. Economic risks such as 
those stemming from Dutch disease or construction cost overruns can be countered 
with accountability mechanisms such as transparency in investment flows, adherence 
to best practice in international financial standards, and fiscal control instruments 
such as rate caps on the price of residential electricity. The risk of enclave economies 
can be minimized with capacity building and training efforts in host countries 
building dams, intellectual patent pools that share intellectual property related to dam 
construction and operation, and local content requirements or stipulations that demand 
joint-ventures including domestic companies. Rent-seeking behavior can be partly 
hedged by requiring that projects meet World Commission on Dams rules or the risk 
management Equator Principles (Equator Principles 2017). Social, political, and 
security ills can be partially remediated with statutory requirements that hydroelectric 
projects have a duty to serve local communities and that some revenues from projects 
be redirected to poverty alleviation and education efforts.  
 
In sum, we see significant benefits to including water in the resource curse literature, 
for a better understanding of how water might become a curse or blessing, and of how 
other resources might benefit from what we have learned about hydroelectric projects.  
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